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Mr.  Chairman,  thank you for your welcome  and  your words  of 
introdgction.  I  count it a  great privilege to be able to talk 
to you  today.  I  count it an even greater privilege to be  able 
to talk to you  about  something which  does  not exist.  Because 
free trade is like absolute  zero in physics,  a  theoretical 
concept not encountered in the day  to day world. 
But this observation should not deflect us  from  realising how 
far we  have been able to move  to free  trade in the years  since 
the  Second World War.  The  1930s were  marked  not only by  the 
Great Depression but by the Smoot-Hawleytariff in the United States, 
retaliation against this very high tariff from  a  whole  range of 
other countries,  a  jungle of restrictions in the  form of both 
high tariff quotas  and  distorting bilateral deals  in Europe. 
~xporting unemployment was  a  fashionable  slogan.  Expanding 
world trade in these conditions was  like swimming  in a  lake 
choked with weed. 
The  reforms  in international finance  and trade worked out at the -- _,_~  __ , ___ --------
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end  and  immediately after the war  and  in which  the United States 
played a  major part laid the foundations  for what was  called the 
one world trading  system.  Under  the aegis of the General Agree-
ment  on Tariffs and Trade tariffs and  other restrictions were 
drastically cut in a  series of major trade negotiations.  The 
average tariff on industrial goods  imported into the United 
States and  the European Community  is now  only  some  4~ percent. 
And  not only were tariffs reduced  they  were  also bound which 
means  in the  jargon of the trade that they cannot be  increased 
without a  negotiation seeking agreement on  appropriate compensation. 
United States exports in 1982  to its biggest customer,  the 
European  Community,  totalled some  $48  billion.  Sy far the greater 
part entered under tariff headings which were  bound.  This meant 
a  degree of access stability and prosperity for American  and 
other exporters undreamt of in the 1930s. 
All this has meant  since 1947  the greatest increase in prosperity 
the West has known  in recorded history.  World  trade which had 
stagnated in the 1930s  rose by  an  average of  8.5 percent a  year 
in volume in 1963-72  and  even in the  .. oil shock years of the late 
1970s was  rising between rates of  5  and  6  percent. 
It is I  know  argued that protectionism is rife and is stifling 
world trade.  But these charges  are exaggerated.  With  the 
exception of steel there are few  restrictions on  trade across 
the Atlantic.  In the  case of textiles,  often instanced as an 
example  of protectionism,  some  40  percent of European  Community 
imports  come  in from developed  countries without quantitative -3-
restrictions - providing in particular a  good market for American 
exporters.  In the case of  trade with Japan you  are all here very 
familiar with the restrictions which  have  been  introduced on 
automobiles in the United States and Europe.  I  shall return to 
this important point later. 
Indeed  the  remarkable  thing about the one world trading  system 
is not that here  and there there have been  some  minor  inroads of 
protection but inthebiggest recession  since the 1930s  the  system 
has held. 
Of  all this general  prosperity the United States has deservedly 
-
taken  a  fair slice.  Not  just in its exports to Europe.  Between 
1970  and  1980  the value of u.s.  agricultural exports  jumped  from 
$7  billion to over  $41  billion.-!  The  U.S.  share in volume  of world 
exports of agricultural goods  rose  from  25  to  39  percent.  In 
1980  the u.s.  registered in its trade balance a  surplus of  just 
under  $27  billion in the agricultural  sector.  If one  looks at 
manufactured goods  the United States share of world exports in 
manufactures rose from 17 percent in 1978  to  21  percent in 1981. 
All  this explains the dramatic rise in the proportion of American 
. 
Gross National Product represented by  foreign trade.  For one 
hundred years after the Civil War  this never  rose above  3  to  4  percent. 
Then  in the  70s  and  the early 80s it soared to a  current 12 percent. 
And  that is the background of  the  change  in the American  scene  from 
the 1930s  to the 1980s.  I  went to a  meeting last fall  shortly after _____________  , 
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I  got to Washington  run  by  the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies.  And  someone  got up  and  asked  the very distinguished panel 
presiding over the proceedings how  he  could explain to the General 
Secretary of the Garment Workers  Union  what  the benefits were of 
free trade.  This was  a  tough question  and the panel understandably 
hesitated.  That redoubtable character Robert Strauss seized the 
microphone  and  gave  an  answer.  He  said,  "Take early retirement". 
That is certainly a  solution.  But the  sketch  I  have given is,  I 
suggest,  a  pretty fair defence of what not absolute free  trade but 
the one world trading  system has brought to main streetAmerica in 
comparison with the memories of fifty years back of  "Buddy  can you 
spare a  dime".  Between  1938  and  1982  the Gross National Product of 
the United States rose in real terms five times.  That is one  answer 
to our questioner. 
But hold it a  number of you will  say.  That is fine  and  dandy  as 
far as  the general  economic  scene goes.  But here  in Detroit the 
automobile  industry is in real difficulty.  And  Pollyanna lectures 
about general  economics  don't help us.  What  about the  proposals 
for  domestic content. 
Anyone  can  see that the situation has  not been without its difficulties 
As  Mark  Twain  said of  "Pilgrim's Progress",  "the statements was 
interesting but tough". 
Production in the United States of motor vehicles  and parts fell 
between  1979  and  1982  by over  50  percent.  Now  they are rising but -5-
there is still a  way  to go.  Employment  and  the domestic market 
have  strengthened markedly. ~But worst of all has  been the foreign 
trade balance.  In 1981  you  exported in this sector $16.2 billion 
and  imported  26.2,  a  deficit of  $10  billion,  in 1982  the deficit 
reached  15~ billion,  in 1983  exports fell further,  imports  rose 
further  and  for the first half of  1983  there is a  deficit at an 
annual  value of  something like $21  billion. 
So  the  argument  seems  persuasive.  Whatever  the general picture 
the case of the automobile  industry is a  special one.  To  protect 
jobs  and plants imports  should be restricted. 
But here  I  have to say that we  should learn  something  from history. 
President Hoover  once  said that if the  Smoot-Hawley tariff were  not 
~ 
approved  by Congress grass would grow in American cities.  Grass 
nearly did grow because  the Smoot-Hawley tariff was  approved  by  the 
Congress.  And  it started the great protectionist slide of  the 1930s. 
The  general  lesson in Europe  as well  as  the United States over the 
last fifty years has been that taking protective measures is like 
giving  slugs of  red eye to  someone  not notoriously on  the wagon. 
The more  you pour the more  is demanded.  The  more  uproarious  the 
demands  become.  And  the worse  afterwards  the patient feels. 
But let me  be more  specific.  Let me  comment  in turn on  four 
aspects of the problem. 
Some  of the causes and effects of increased competition and 
requests for protection. -6-
The  question of our relationship with developing countries. 
The  question of steel because here  you  are one of its biggest 
customers. 
Japan,  which  can never be far from  your  thoughts. 
Let me  try and  deal  in turn with  some  of  the causes and effects 
of  the problems  of competition and associated requests for 
protection.  In the first place high interest rates.  These  have 
come  down  markedly over the last two  years.  But are still 
historically very high.  They  pose  questions about  investment.  \ 
Where  is the eager or cunning  soul who  would  risk his money  in 
a  speculative investment when  sitting idly by he  can earn nearly 
9  percent on  a  money  market account.  And  who  is going to hold 
for wary prospective customers  a  huge  stock of  showroom  automobiles 
with the  same  interest rates.  · mhe  news  that these are  shading 
upwards  is not over the next year going  to  stop the remarkable 
recovery which  has  shown  itself in the United States.  But it must 
cast a  chill on  many  of you  in the automobile business here. 
However,  cutting imports is not going  to bring down  interest rates. 
That can probably only be  done  by  reducing  the  budget deficit. 
Then  the  strength of  the dollar which  is largely caused by  high 
interest rates.  One  economic  truth often forgotten is that a 
strong currency plays a  large part in the encouragement of 
protectionism.  Unemployment  and  low capacity utilisation of 
course call for measures  of this kind.  But they tend to be 
selective.  Over-valuation of any  currency  tends to call for 
more  general  protectionist measures. -7-
Let us  look  back  on  the 1970s.  In the final  phase of the breakdown 
of  the Bretton Woods  system the dollar was  over-valued - it was 
generally held - by  some  15 percent.  The  result was  the Mills 
Bill in 1970  and  the Burke-Hartke Bill.  These would have  limited 
virtually all U.S.  imports.  And  these Bills very nearly got past 
the post.  At the  time  the unemployment rate was at its twenty 
year  low.  In 1976/77  the dollar was  again over-valued and again 
protectionist pressures rose.  An  IMF  analysis of u.s.  trade 
measures  shows  that the number of  times  anti-dumping or counter-
vailing duties were  imposed on  the various escape clauses leading 
to quotas and/or market agreements were  invoked was  higher in 
1976  and 1977  than the previous  two  years  (16  actions in 1977  and 
26  in 1976  against  5  in 1975  and  9  in 1974) •  1974  was  a  year in 
which  U.S.  unemployment was historically high  and  real growth 
declined by  over one percent for the first time  since 1954.  But 
Congress  passed the Trade Act authorising the extensive 
liberalisation that took place in the Tokyo  Round.  The dollar 
and  the current account were  then in approximate equilibrium. 
A year ago it was  generally estimated that the dollar was  over-
valued by  about  20  percent and the yen  was  under-valued  by  20 
percent.  The  situation is now  marginally better.  But you  here 
have  seen  the results.  Rising protectionism,  the passage  by  the 
House  of Representatives of  a  Domestic  Content Bill,  a  Bill in 
clear violation both of the principles of  the General  Agreement 
of Tariffs and Trade,  of the Ministerial Declaration at the  GATT 
meeting  a  year ago  and of the Williamsburg Declaration signed 
among  others in June  by  the United States. -8-
So  the strength  of  the dollar has  caused  a  good deal of damage. 
It cuts demand  abroad for American  exports for industrial 
and  farm products alike and it makes  imports more attractive. 
But what would be the effect on  the strength of  the dollar if you 
were to cut imports.  The  answer is that the trade deficit would 
shrink and  the dollar would rise still further.  And  the problem 
would get worse. 
Then  there is the question of relations with developing countries. 
Often this is put in abstract terms.  Let me  here in Detroit put 
it in practical terms.  United States exports of transport 
equipment to,  for  example,  Latin America  amounted in 1981  to 
$5.4 billion, in 1982  to $3.3 billion,  in the first half of  this 
year to $1.07.  And  all this not because of unfair competition 
but simply because Latin Ameri.ca  cannot  import;  they cannot 
finance their debt. 
In 1982  just under  $120  billion of United States exports,  some 
42  percent of  the total,  went to developing countries.  On  these 
purchases of American  goods  some  6  million American  jobs depend. 
How  are these countries supplised to pay for what  they  buy  from 
you?  Few  would  argue that the American  taxpayer  should pay for 
them.  But these countries need  to earn foreign  exchange.  How 
can they do  so if they are kept out of one  of  the biggest markets 
in the world?  Then  there is an  economic factor.  This  country 
grew great on  change.  The  United States not only recognised it. -9-
It pioneered change.  Think of  the Bell telephone,  the Model  T, 
the Bl7  and colour television.  But the world in which you  are 
now  year in year out much  more heavily involved is changing too 
more  rapidly than ever before.  And  there is no  international 
statute that says that production of automobiles or the steel 
that you  use for  them  should be limited to the North American or 
European continents.  The  developing world is getting in on  the 
act,  just as  they got into textiles in the  50s  and  60s  and  into 
radios in the  70.  Can  we,  like King  Canute,  try and  stop the 
tide?  Or  should we  not employ  the skill and  the inventiveness 
of the peoples of North America  and Europe to move  into more 
technologically advanced production both  in steel and elsewhere. 
Let me  say  a  word  about steel since this is a  very important part 
of  automobile production.  Just as with automobiles with American 
steel mills operating at well under  60  percent of capacity cutting 
imports  can  seem very attractive.  But pause to think for  a 
moment  of the consequences.  Let us  assume that by  some  stroke 
of sinister magic all steel imports were eliminated.  Would  the 
problems  of  the American steel industry be  solved?  No.  Without 
foreign  competition they would  be aggravated.  Plant modernisation, 
already lagging behind that of competitor countries,  would  be 
further delayed.  Only  34  percent of steel produced in the United 
States is by  continuous casting,  the most  advanced  steelmaking 
technique,  compared with  82  percent in Japan  and  56  percent in the 
European  Community.  The  Chairman of  a  major u.s.  steel firm 
estimated recently that one-third of the United States steelmaking 
facilities required modernisation.  Without imports  labour -10-
productivity would decline further and  costs would  increase. 
Already wage  rates in the steel sector are well  above  the average 
for manufacturing industry.  Prices would rise and  the rise in 
prices would have  an  adverse effect well beyond the steel industry. 
All  that wide  range of domestic  industries that use American steel, 
and  I  am  today  speaking to one  of the biggest,  would also lose 
competitiveness.  And  the great danger is that pressures for 
increased protection elsewhere increase.  If they  succeeded this 
would mean  retaliation against American  exports which would 
inflict grave damage  on  the American  economy. 
Then  Japan: 
The problems of the Community  - and  I  may  add the United States -
with Japan are ascribed from  time  to  time  by  Japanese  commentators 
to workshy Europeans  and Amerisans  facing efficient Japanese 
competition,  to sheer protectionism,  to a  reluctance to adjust. 
The picture in reality is a  different one.  The  Community•s 
problems with Japan  stem  from  a  combination of  three factors. 
Each  on its own  would  be of limited import.  Taken  together,  like 
the chemicals in a  dangerous  combination,  they can create an 
explosion. 
The first is the  size of our bilateral deficit with Japan.  In 
1963  the ten present Members  of the European Community  had a 
trivial 86  million dollar deficit with Japan.  This  rocketed to 
some  500  million in 1970,  to 3.4 billion in 1975  and over 11 
billion in 1982. -11-
At  the  same  time Japanese exports to Europe  in certain highly 
sensitive areas like automobiles,  colour television tubes  and 
sets,  and certain highly developed machine tools rose massively. 
At the  same  time  European business found it difficult year in year 
out to penetrate the Japanese market. 
Taken in isolation,  these factors are not all in themselves 
decisive.  We  run bilateral surpluses and deficits in turn with 
our trading partners.  But taken together,  a  massive  and  increasing 
deficit,  increasing inroads on our  sensitive industries and  a  sense 
that our manufacturers  cannot get into the Japanese market to the 
same  extent as  they can get into other industrialised countries of 
the world creates risks which  can become  dangerous. 
Let me  give  just a  few  figures to support what  I  have  said. 
Total Japanese exports of manufactured goods in 1960  amounted 
to 3  billion dollars.  In 1981  the figure  had  soared to 136 billion 
dollars.  But Japanese  imports of manufactures in 1960 at just 
under  1  billion dollars had risen in 1981  to only  28  billion dollars. 
Again  in 1980  the European Community  imported manufactured products 
equal  to just under  800  dollars per head.  The  figure for the 
United States was  547  dollars,  the figure for Japan was  233.  Thus 
Japan's  imports of manufactured goods  are  about the  same  value as 
those of  Switzerland,  an  economy  one-tenth of that of Japan. -12-
And  in per capita terms Japan is next to last among  Member  States 
of the 0ECD.  The  percentage of total imports represented by 
manufactured goods  is equally striking - 55 percent in the case 
of  the United States,  46.5 percent in the case of  the  Community  -
only  22  percent in the case of Japan. 
These  figures demonstrate more clearly than  any  long argument 
the size of  an  imbalance which is putting a  strain on  the world 
trading  system. 
What  therefore can be  done?  It seems  to us  in the Community  that 
there are  two courses of action.  The first is short term.  The 
second is long  term and more essential.  The first course lies 
in ensuring  a  certain moderation  in exports  from  Japan where 
there is prospect of rapid growth  and where  there are political 
and  industrial sensitivities in the United States  and Europe. 
This is not to make  the case for protectionism.  But this is to 
say that it is compatible with the maintenance of  the open world 
trading  system if it is recognised  from  time  to time  in certain 
difficult areas that there are political and  social limitations 
to the rapidity of  adjustment.  But this leads to another logical 
conclusion.  I  have mentioned  adjustment.  If adjustment does not 
take place,  if fears for the  speed of adjustment are used to block 
~ 
adjustment entirely then we  could well  have  been producing here, 
at great cost to the American  taxpayer,  stagecoaches  - rolling 
out every week  in their hundreds at a  cost to the federal 
government of  thousands of dollars - stockpiled in  some  great ,, 
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graveyard  somewhere  and all a  tribute to  some  remarkably energetic 
lobbyist.  They  flourish  in all countries and of  course 
particularly a  country as energetic as  the United States.  So  the 
rationale for  a  temporary limitation is that there is a 
restructuring and  a  genuine  and purposeful restructuring.  Other-
wise whether it be  the United States or Europe we  are left 
inactive in the world market we  depend  on  and  increasingly 
dependent  on  forlorn attempts to sell stagecoaches to a  world 
which will require jet propelled automobiles. 
The  second course of action which is essential is that Japan 
opens its market to the Western world for manufactured goods. 
And  here  I  think we  can both be glad to see that we  have  seen 
some  progress.  The  administration of Mr.  Nakasone is clearly 
making  a  genuine  attempt to ensure that Japan  assumes  the 
international trading responsibilities commensurate with its 
sensational  success as  a  world exporter.  On  the 1st of April  1983 
a  series of tariff and non-tariff measures were  brought into 
effect.  And  on  the 21st of October certain other measures were 
implemented.  We  need of course to see  how  these measures  develop. 
But recognition by our Japanese  friends  that they need to exercise 
some  moderation in exports in certain sensitive sectors towards 
the United States and Europe,  recognition I  hope  in these  sectors 
in the United States and Europe  that the  justification for  this 
moderation  can  only be restructuring and  a  move  towards  increased 
efficiencyon our side and  a  steady~ening up  of  the Japanese market 
for manufactured goods. -14-
These measures  should begin to deal with one of the major  problems 
in international trade which both of us have  faced over the last 
fifteen years. 
Mr.  Chairman,  I  return at the end to where  I  began.  Free trade 
as  such  does  not exist.  But the free world with substantial 
leadership from  the United States has made  over the last 
thirty-five years great strides towards it.  This has meant  the 
biggest increase in prosperity in the West  in recorded history. 
It has  changed  the face of this country,  of Europe  and of the 
world.  The  siren. voices of protectionism are  seductive.  But 
we  need to remember  the cost,  the fact that just over fifty 
years  ago with the Smoot-Hawley tariff and equivalent restrictions 
in Europe we  saw  the  damage  that protectionism can bring.  For 
the protectionist bell does  not toll simply for one  industry. 
It tolls for us all.  History will never forgive  us if just as 
.. we  were  emerging  from  the worst  recession for half  a  century our 
courage faltered and we  plunged back again into the stifling 
restrictions and  the poverty of  the 1930s.  Whatever  arguments 
we  may  have across the Atlantic,  the United States and Europe 
have  to work  in partnership to keep the one world trading  system 
alive.  So  far we  have managed it.  I  salute today the  courage 
in this country and  in our  own  Community  which has made  this 
possible.  And  I  am  sure that together we  will continue to succeed. 